This study documented findings on the relation between cognitive functioning (perceptual speed, memory, fluency, and knowledge) and cardiovascular and metabolic disease in a sample of very old adults (ages 70 and older), both cross-sectionally (n ϭ 516) and longitudinally (n ϭ 206) in a 4-year follow-up. After age, SES, sex, and dementia status were controlled for, 4 diagnoses were negatively associated with cognition: congestive heart failure, stroke, coronary heart disease, and diabetes mellitus, with a joint effect of 0.47 standard deviations. The impact of disease status was largest on perceptual speed and fluency, memory was impacted only by diabetes, and knowledge was not related to any somatic diagnosis. There was no differential decline in participants diagnosed with 1 of these 4 diseases and those who were not. The only cardiovascular risk factor associated with cognitive performance was alcohol consumption.
⑀4 allele), or metabolic (e.g., impaired insulin metabolism) mechanisms (for an overview of these mechanisms, see Everson, Helkala, Kaplan, & Salonen, 2001) . A metabolic disease often associated with cognitive functioning is diabetes mellitus (e.g., Croxon & Jagger, 1995; Haan, Shemanski, Jagust, Manolio, & Kuller, 1999; Perlmuter et al., 1984; Schaie, 1996) . Diabetes most probably affects cognitive function through hyper-or hypoglycemia, which interferes with acetylcholine synthesis (Kumari, Brunner, & Fuhrer, 2000; Ryan, 2001) .
In the present study, we examined the cross-sectional and longitudinal effects of prevalence and incidence of cardiovascular and metabolic disorders on cognitive performance. Additionally, we were interested in two questions of more theoretical importance. First, it has often been claimed (e.g., Beers & Berkow, 2000) that in very old age vulnerability to the negative effects of physiological pathology increases to the point that cognitive performance in this group may be determined more by the effects of organic pathology than by the so-called normal aging process. In this article, we investigated whether, consistent with the increasedvulnerability hypothesis, the impact of somatic health increases with age. In a next step, we examined whether the effects of chronological age on cognition are indeed mediated by failing health. A related question is whether the effects of health on cognition are general or whether they remain restricted to specific health problems. For instance, for each of the disorders noted above, clear brain-related mechanisms exist that can explain the relation with cognition. However, if one considers that in very old age cognitive functioning becomes increasingly dependent on intactness of the somatic substrate (see the common-cause hypothesis of cognitive aging; Lindenberger & Baltes, 1994 , 1997 Salthouse & Czaja, 2000) and that the cognitive system shows decreasing plasticity with advancing age (P. B. Baltes & Kliegl, 1992; Singer, Lindenberger, & Baltes, 2000; Verhaeghen & Marcoen, 1996) , one might expect a rather general negative effect of somatic health on cognitive functioning, apart from the specific brain-mediated effects shown in younger cohorts. Given the high prevalence of cardiovascular problems in old age and their potential impact on cognition (e.g., P. K. Elias, Elias, D'Agostino, Silbershatz, & Wolf, 1999; Hill, 1989; Launer, Feskens, Kalmijn, & Kromhout, 1996) , the second aspect of somatic health that we investigated here is the impact of cardiovascular risk factors on cognitive functioning.
We should stress that the question about the relation between health and cognition in very old age is important not only for advancing understanding of cognitive functioning in this age group but also because it has practical implications, especially in light of the possibility of prevention and intervention. Recent evidence indicates that real-life consequences of individual differences in intelligence are further augmented in very old age (e.g., Allaire & Marsiske, 1999 ; M. M. Baltes & Lang, 1997; Diehl, Willis, & Schaie, 1995) . For instance, using the same data set as analyzed here, Lindenberger and Baltes (1995) demonstrated that cognition explained 37% of individual differences in measures of activities of daily living and up to 45% in expanded levels of everyday competence (reflecting optional activities necessary for a satisfactory life, e.g., leisure, social, and instrumental activities of daily living; see also M. M. Baltes, Maas, Wilms, Borchelt, & Little, 1999) . In advanced age, the level of cognitive functioning may be one aspect that contributes considerably to the quality of one's life and to the types (and extent) of interaction with the physical and social environments that one can still enjoy.
In sum, in the present study, we examined the relationships between CVD, diabetes, CVD risk factors, and intellectual functioning in very old age. Data were derived from the Berlin Aging Study (BASE; P. B. Baltes & Mayer, 1999) , a locally representative sample of men and women ages 70 to 103 (M ϭ 85 years). One of the strengths of this study is that it included a computerized assessment of five intellectual abilities and objective clinical assessments of somatic and mental health status. Participants in the initial BASE cross-sectional sample (n ϭ 516; stratified by age and sex) completed 14 sessions of individual face-to-face assessment over a 3-5-month period. Survivors have been followed longitudinally. Here, we report crosssectional results at baseline (n ϭ 516) and results from a 4-year longitudinal follow-up (n ϭ 206).
Method
More details about the variables assessed, the sample tested, and the procedures used can be found in P. B. Baltes and Mayer (1999) ; P. B. Baltes and Smith (1997) ; Lindenberger and Baltes (1997); and Lindenberger, Mayr, and Kliegl (1993) . Here, we offer a brief overview.
Sample
The original BASE consisted of an initial 14-session assessment (Time 1 [T1]) of 516 individuals (age range at first assessment ϭ 70 -103, mean age ϭ 84.92 years, SD ϭ 8.66), stratified by age and sex, resulting in 43 men and 43 women in each of six different age brackets (70 -74, 75-79, 80 -84, 85-89, 90 -94, and 95ϩ years) . A total of 1,908 individuals, whose addresses were obtained by a random draw from the city registry, had to be contacted to obtain this sample. The initial assessment (T1) was conducted between mid-1990 and June 1993. The longitudinal extension of BASE involved four occasions (T1, Time 2 [T2], Time 3 [T3] , and Time 4 [T4]), each scheduled about 2 years apart. At the second wave of measurement, only parts of the cognitive test battery were collected. Therefore, this article reports on participants tested on two occasions, that is, the first (1990 -1993 ; n ϭ 516) and the third (1995) (1996) ; n ϭ 206) assessments. On average, T3 data were collected 3.99 years (SD ϭ 0.69) after T1 data. More details on the longitudinal samples can be found in Singer, Verhaeghen, Ghisletta, Lindenberger, and Baltes (2003) ; details on selectivity (i.e., drop-out effects) can be found in Lindenberger, Singer, and Baltes (2002) . In brief, as usual in longitudinal aging studies, there was evidence for relatively strong selectivity effects. The longitudinal sample scored 0.74 standard deviations above the mean of the full cross-sectional sample on the intelligence composite and 0.27 standard deviations on the SES composite; 59% of the size of the attrition effect on intelligence and 30% of the effect of attrition on SES was due to mortality. At T1, the total sample was, on average, 84.92 years old (SD ϭ 8.66); the participants had received an average of 10.75 years of education (SD ϭ 2.34); and 50% were female, and 50% were male. At T3, mean age of the participating sample was 83.62 years (SD ϭ 7.00); average number of years of education was 11.23 (SD ϭ 2.45); and 51% were female, and 49% were male. Lindenberger and Baltes (1997) , some of these abilities were measured by three tests. Because of time constraints on the follow-up assessments, only two tests per construct were administered at T3. A unit-weighted intelligence composite was computed from the four cognitive composites; correlations among the four abilities ranged from .63 to .73. Autocorrelations over the 4 years between T1 and T3 were high: .69 for perceptual speed; .65 for memory; .76 for fluency, .79 for knowledge, and .83 for the intelligence composite. A detailed description of the tests can be found elsewhere (Lindenberger & Baltes, 1994 , 1997 Lindenberger et al., 1993) . The five composites were scaled by linear transformation such that scores at the first measurement occasion for the full sample conformed to a T metric (i.e., M ϭ 50, SD ϭ 10).
Measures
SES. Four variables were used to represent SES: (a) income (on a 5-point scale); (b) occupational prestige (based on a standard rating scale in Germany); (c) social class (on a 5-point scale); and (d) number of years of education. Out of these four variables, we constructed a unit-weighted SES composite (after z transformation), to be used as a covariate in our analyses.
Somatic diagnoses. Of the possible diagnostic categories, 26 were used in BASE. We concentrated on CVD (myocardial infarction, congestive heart failure, coronary heart disease, stroke, and hypertension) and diabetes mellitus. To sort individual participants into diagnostic categories, psychiatrists and internists held a consensus conference (one at T1, one at T3) in which all available information (medical examination, interview, resting electrocardiography [ECG] , blood pressure, Doppler ultrasound, quantitative computer tomography, flow cytometry, lymphocyte stimulation, major histocompatibility compatibility types, serum, plasma, and urinalyses) was brought together. For each individual, each illness's diagnostic certainty and objective and subjective severity were rated (for more details, see Steinhagen-Thiessen & Borchelt, 1999) . All discernible diseases and diagnosable pathological states were classified according to the four-digit code of the 9th edition of the International Classification of Diseases (World Health Organization, 1978) , on a rather low aggregation level. All diagnoses were coded independent of each other. Note, however, that some diagnoses tend to overlap. For instance, myocardial infarction tends to be superimposed on a diagnosis of coronary heart disease, but the association is not absolute (in the present sample, 89 of 110 participants who were diagnosed with myocardial infarction were also diagnosed with coronary heart disease; 89 of 176 participants diagnosed with coronary heart disease also had myocardial infarction). For the myocardial infarction and coronary heart disease diagnoses, case history, medication history, interview with family doctor, physical examination, and resting ECG findings were taken into account. At least two of the following needed to be present for coronary heart disease: typical angina, stenocardia, nitrate therapy, family doctor's diagnosis, and typical ECG abnormalities; myocardial infarction was diagnosed on the basis of case history, including the interview with the general physician, plus the ECG findings typical of myocardial infarction.
Interrater reliability for the diagnostic categories was .90. For the present analyses, ratings were recoded into three categories: diagnosis absent, diagnosis present, and diagnosis missing; the latter category typically implied diagnostic uncertainty.
Cardiovascular health risk factors. Smoking behavior (current and former smoking status, amount of units smoked per day currently or formerly, starting age of current or former smoking, and quitting age of former smoking) and alcohol consumption (current alcohol status, scored as yes or no; number of units consumed per day) were assessed through a questionnaire. Levels of high-density lipoprotein (HDL cholesterol, which is correlated negatively with the risk for CVD) and low-density lipoprotein (LDL cholesterol, which is correlated positively with the risk for CVD) were determined from blood samples (no fasting period was observed prior to blood sampling). The body mass index was calculated from height and weight.
Statistical Analyses
To determine the influence of somatic diagnosis on level of performance at the first measurement point and on 4-year change scores, we conducted a series of hierarchical regression analyses. Age, sex, SES, and dementia diagnosis were entered first as control variables, and each of the diagnoses was entered in a second step. The effects of multimorbidity were tested in a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). The effects of risk factors were assessed through hierarchical regression, after we controlled for age, sex, SES, dementia diagnosis, and the presence or absence of each of the somatic diagnoses found in the previous analyses to be correlated with cognition. Alpha level for statistical testing was set at .05.
Results

Somatic Diagnoses and Cognition: Cross-Sectional Analyses
In Table 1 , we report the significant results of the regression analysis relating cardiovascular diagnoses and diabetes (scored as present or absent) to cognition (scored as a continuous variable), after we partialed out age, sex, the SES composite, and dementia diagnosis. Because of missing values due to diagnostic uncertainty, valid sample size (N) was lower than the number of participants and varied from analysis to analysis. Two CVD diagnoses were not related to cognition: hypertension and myocardial infarction. Four diagnoses proved to be significantly and negatively correlated with intelligence. These were, in order of decreasing importance, stroke, congestive heart failure, diabetes, and coronary heart disease. The amount of variance accounted for after we controlled for age, sex, SES, and dementia status was slight (between 0.5% and 2.0% of the variance), but the effect sizes were moderate: B values (which indicate the average difference in cognitive test score between participants with and without the diagnosis) ranged from Ϫ1.8 to Ϫ3.2, or (given that SD ϭ 10) from Ϫ0.18 to Ϫ0.32 standard deviations. Taken together, the four cognition-related somatic diagnoses explained 1.6% of the variance in intelligence (after we controlled for age, sex, SES, and dementia). The combined effect of the four cognition-related diagnoses (i.e., the sum of the B values) was Ϫ4.7, or Ϫ0.47 standard deviations. Fluency and perceptual speed appeared to be the variables most impacted by somatic health, yielding the larger B values; memory was associated only with diabetes; knowledge was not reliably associated with any of the four diagnoses.
We hypothesized that stroke would carry much of the variance associated with other cardiovascular or metabolic disease diagnoses and that the effects of these diagnoses would emerge only when stroke was controlled for. To test this assertion, we first redid the hierarchical regression analysis by using only the sample of 362 participants who did not receive a diagnosis of dementia, stroke, or both at T1 (see Table 2 ). All of the significant effects from the previous hierarchical regression analysis were confirmed, with the exception of the relation between intelligence and coronary heart disease and of the combined effects of the diagnoses on perceptual speed. Additionally, we examined the partial correlation matrix between all cardiovascular diagnoses and cognition in this selected sample, controlling for age, SES, and gender. No new significant correlations were found involving the intelligence composite; knowledge correlated significantly with peripheral nervous system disorders (r ϭ Ϫ.09, n ϭ 354) and myocardial infarction (r ϭ Ϫ.10, n ϭ 331), and fluency correlated significantly with peripheral vascular disease (r ϭ Ϫ.10, n ϭ 354). Given that the change in result was minor and did not affect more than one ability, we concluded that the presence of stroke patients did not have a masking effect on the data. Therefore, to benefit from the statistical power associated with the full sample size, all subsequent analyses were conducted using the original sample.
The sample was split into a group of older adults without any of the four cognition-related diagnoses (n ϭ 105) and a group of individuals with one or more of these four diagnoses (n ϭ 318). Table 3 reports differences between these two groups for the cognitive variables, age, sex, dementia status, and SES. For all variables, significant effects were found; on all variables with an evaluative direction, the healthy sample fared better. The effect on cognition seemed to be moderately large: For the intelligence composite, the two health groups were 6.3 T score units, that is, 0.63 standard deviations apart. After age, sex, Coronary heart disease (n ϭ 455; prevalence ϭ 37%)
Step Congestive heart failure (n ϭ 493; prevalence ϭ 65%)
Step Figure 1 depicts means and standard errors for the intelligence composite as a function of multimorbidity of the four cognitionrelated diagnoses (diagnosis absent: n ϭ 105; one diagnosis present, n ϭ 136; two diagnoses present, n ϭ 122; three diagnoses present, n ϭ 55; and all four diagnoses present, n ϭ 5). A univariate ANOVA with intelligence as the dependent variable; multimorbidity as the predictor; and age, sex, SES, and dementia status as covariates showed a significant effect of multimorbidity, F(4, 414) ϭ 4.90, MSE ϭ 53.58, p Ͻ .05. Repeated contrast analysis, however, showed that there was a significant difference in intelligence score only between the group with no diagnosis and the group with one diagnosis; all further repeated contrasts proved nonsignificant, indicating that the groups of participants with one or more of the diagnoses were not reliably different in cognitive performance, as can clearly be seen in Figure 1 . Figure 2 depicts a scatter plot of intelligence scores (at T1) as a function of age, separated by individuals who were diagnosed with one or more of the four cognition-related somatic disorders and those who were not, along with the freely estimated regression lines for each group. Regression analysis including a dummy intercept term for health group and a Health Group ϫ Age interaction term (Berry & Feldman, 1985) showed that the two regression lines were reliably different from each other, R 2 ϭ .33; R 2 for inclusion of the dummy intercept and the interaction term ϭ .029, F(2, 419) ϭ 8.99, p Ͻ .05. The line for the participants with at least one cognition-related somatic diagnosis had a reliably smaller intercept (57.44 vs. 63.73, evaluated at age 70) and a reliably shallower slope (Ϫ0.54 vs. Ϫ0.76) than the line for individuals without one of these disorders.
Somatic Diagnoses and Cognition: Four-Year Longitudinal Analyses
For the 4-year longitudinal analyses (T1 to T3), the sample was split into three groups, one for each of the four cognition-related diagnoses: (a) the group of participants who did not have that particular cognition-related diagnosis at T1 and T3 (diagnosis Coronary heart disease (n ϭ 320)
Step Congestive heart failure (n ϭ 346)
Step absent), (b) the group of participants who received that particular diagnosis prior to T1 and held it at T3 (diagnosis present), and (c) the group of participants who received the diagnosis at T3 but not T1 (incidence). Analogous groups were constructed for the presence, absence, and incidence of any of the four cognition-related diagnoses (called hereafter the summary data). The breakdown in number of participants for each of the three groups was as follows: for coronary heart disease, 96, 70, and 24 for diagnosis absent, diagnosis present, and incidence, respectively; for congestive heart failure, 46, 101, and 49, respectively; for diabetes, 147, 40, and 18, respectively; for stroke, 183, 14, and 7, respectively; and for the summary data, 18, 108, and 41, respectively. Note that prevalence rates in our sample were high (e.g., the American Heart Association, 2002, estimates prevalence of congestive heart failure in the 75-year-and-older age bracket at 9.8%). The discrepancy may have been due (a) to oversampling of the very oldest cohorts in our study (i.e., compared with the population, we had a disproportionate number of the oldest old-age 85 and older), (b) to the careful objective individual assessment of disorders in our study, and (c) to the inclusion of mild cases in the diagnosis-present category. Figure 3 displays the means and standard errors for the intelligence composite of the three groups for each of the four diagnoses and the summary data as a function of time in study, controlled for age, sex, SES, and dementia status. The graph shows that for all diagnoses, with the possible exception of stroke, the slopes for the three health groups were remarkably similar. To test for group differences in the longitudinal slopes, we conducted a repeated measures ANOVA for each of the five comparisons, with time of measurement and type of cognition (i.e., speed, memory, fluency, and knowledge) as within-subject factors; health group (i.e., diagnosis absent, diagnosis present, and incidence) as a betweensubjects factor, and age, sex, SES, and dementia status as covariates. None of the interactions involving time by health group reached significance in any of the four cognition-related diagnoses, nor did they in the summary data. There was, however, a marginal trend toward a three-way Time ϫ Type of Cognition ϫ Health Group interaction for the stroke diagnosis, F(6, 591) ϭ 2.03, MSE ϭ 19.43, p ϭ .06. Decline was more precipitous in the stroke incidence group (Ϫ5.53 T score units) than in the other two stroke groups (diagnosis absent ϭ Ϫ2.19; diagnosis present ϭ Ϫ1.93); the decline in the stroke incidence group was more apparent for speed and fluency (Ϫ8.20 and Ϫ6.31, respectively) than for memory and knowledge (Ϫ0.01 and Ϫ4.35, respectively). Note that the incidence group for stroke was very small (n ϭ 7), and, therefore, power for the detection of the interaction was very low. This finding may warrant treating the trend as at least clinically significant.
With the exception of stroke, F(2, 197) ϭ 2.63, MSE ϭ 253.41, p ϭ .75, all health group main effects were significant. Composite intelligence score as a function of age in the group of participants with at least one of the four cognition-related diagnoses (i.e., diabetes, congestive heart failure, coronary heart disease, or stroke) and the group of participants without any cognition-related diagnosis. CVS ϭ cardiovascular syndrome; Diab ϭ diabetes.
shows that, in general, the diagnosis-absent group performed at a higher level than the diagnosis-present group. At the first time of measurement, the incidence group was not reliably distinguishable from the diagnosis-absent group for most diagnoses, with the notable exception of diabetes.
Cardiovascular Risk Factors and Cognition
The only cardiovascular risk factor that was reliably associated with cognitive performance at T1 after age, sex, SES, dementia status, and the presence or absence of the four cognition-related diagnoses were controlled for was alcohol consumption, that is, an affirmative answer by the participant to the question regarding whether he or she presently ever drank alcohol (380 participants indicated consuming alcohol). For the intelligence composite, the increment in R 2 was .02; the effect size (i.e., B for the regression line) was Ϫ3.66. The effect of alcohol consumption was significant for all four cognitive variables (knowledge: B ϭ Ϫ3.44; fluency: B ϭ Ϫ2.63; memory: B ϭ Ϫ3.80; and speed: B ϭ Ϫ2.61). None of the cardiovascular risk factors were reliably associated with 4-year declines in cognition. When only the sample of participants without a dementia and/or stroke diagnosis was considered, the pattern of results did not change, with the exception of a nonsignificant effect for alcohol consumption on speed. For the intelligence composite, the increment in R 2 was .03; the effect size was Ϫ3.52. For knowledge, B ϭ Ϫ2.88; for fluency: B ϭ Ϫ2.92; for memory: B ϭ Ϫ4.24; and for speed: B ϭ Ϫ1.94, ns. 
Discussion
In the present study, we investigated selected aspects of somatic health and their relation to cognition in a relatively large sample of very old (i.e., ages 70 and older) adults, followed over a period of 4 years.
Somatic Diagnoses and Health: Regression Analyses
Three cardiovascular disorders-namely, congestive heart failure, myocardial infarction, and stroke-were found to be reliably associated with cognitive functioning, even after the effects of age, sex, SES, and dementia status were controlled for. Diabetes also had a negative impact on cognition.
There are essentially three ways to assess the impact of these disorders on the aging cognitive system. The first is to calculate the percentage of variance explained by diagnostic status over and above the effects of age, sex, SES, and dementia status. This indicates the impact of disease over and above the effects associated with aging and biographical variables. The increments in R 2 ranged between .005 and .020, and, therefore, somatic disease status explained 2% or less of the variance over and above the effects of age, sex, SES, and dementia. All disorders influenced perceptual speed and fluency, but none impacted knowledge; the only reliable effect on episodic memory performance was noted for diabetes. Therefore, the effects of disease status are not general but remain restricted to speeded tests.
The second way of evaluating the impact of somatic disorders on cognition is to examine the regression coefficients, which indicate the difference in score between participants with and without the disorders. This difference was relatively large: It ranged from Ϫ0.18 standard deviations to Ϫ0.32 standard deviations. An alternative way of presenting these coefficients is to scale them compared with the effects of aging as indicated by the regression weight for age. Then, diabetes had an effect equal to that of 4.0 years of aging (in other words, performance of an 80-year-old with diabetes was comparable to that of an 84-year-old without diabetes); coronary heart disease of 3.9 years of aging, congestive heart failure of 5.3 years of aging, and stroke of 7.4 years of aging. These effects were small compared with the effect of dementia, which decreased performance by 1 standard deviation (an effect about equal to 24 years of aging).
The third way of assessing the impact of somatic diagnosis is to look at its mediating effects on cognition, that is, by calculating how much of the variance in cognition associated with age (as opposed to total variance) is due to individual differences in disease status (see Salthouse, 1991, pp. 322-323 , for the calculation). Taken together, the four cognition-related diagnoses explained 17% of the age-related variance in the intelligence composite (knowledge: 22%; fluency: 19%; memory: 24%, and speed: 19%).
Summarized, we can state that somatic status has an impact on cognitive performance. This impact is relatively modest, however, compared with the effects of dementia.
Somatic Diagnoses: Are Health Effects General?
Our results go against the hypothesis that in very old age the cognitive system becomes vulnerable to any negative change in health status. Only a limited number of diagnoses were reliably associated with decreased cognitive performance. Moreover, for each of the four cognition-related disorders, physiological CNSrelated mechanisms exist that can explain the relation with cognition. CVDs interfere with normal blood flow and thus restrict oxygenation of the CNS. Stroke has a direct impact on neuronal tissue. Diabetes mellitus may affect cognitive function through hyper-or hypoglycemia, which interferes with acetylcholine synthesis (Kumari et al., 2000) . Thus, it appears that the effects of somatic health on cognition are mediated by mechanisms that are directly brain-related. Additional evidence that this may be the case comes from the finding that these disorders do not impact all cognitive variables. Vocabulary, presumably an estimate of the extent of an individual's knowledge base acquired over a lifetime, is not sensitive to the effects of health; episodic memory is affected only by diabetes. Fluency and speed, the two variables affected by all four diagnoses, are tests that require fast online responses from the individual, and it makes sense that these aspects of cognition are negatively affected by oxygenation deficiencies or neurotransmitter depletion.
Note, however, that our data may contain a number of false negatives. That is, we did not find reliable correlations between intelligence and somatic diagnosis for some disorders that have been known to correlate with cognition in other studies involving older adults. The most noticeable false negatives are hypertension (e.g., Waldstein, 1995) and myocardrial infarction. One possible reason might be that our cognitive battery (which was, after all, not designed to capture the effects of specific somatic syndromes but to assess a wide range of cognitive functions) was too broad to precisely measure the effects of these diseases on particular subsets of cognition. For instance, the effects of hypertension seem to be most noticeable in episodic memory (Denicoff, Joffe, Lakshmanan, Robbins, & Rubinow, 1990; Wahlin, Robins-Wahlin, Small, & Bäckman, 1998; Waldstein, 1995) . Maybe our episodic memory measure (which was associated only with diabetes) was simply not sensitive enough.
Somatic Diagnoses: Decreased Vulnerability in Very Old Age?
Old age is generally assumed to be associated with increased cognitive vulnerability. For instance, the disablement process model by Verbrugge and Jette (1994) claims that increased morbidity due to the cumulation of risk factors in old age leads to functional limitations, such as a decrease in cognitive functioning, which in turn may lead to increased disability in a number of areas of daily living. Some results of our study, however, counter this hypothesis and, in fact, point at decreasing vulnerability of the cognitive system vis-à-vis somatic morbidity.
A first result pointing in the direction of the decreasing impact of somatic disorders on the cognitive system is the lack of effect of multimorbidity on cognitive performance. Rather than showing a cumulative effect of added diagnoses, our data imply a knock-out effect; that is, the presence of one of the four cognition-related diseases led to a reliable reduction in cognitive performance, but the further presence of other cognition-related diseases did not decrease performance beyond the initial reduction (see Figure 1) . A second result that runs counter to the hypothesis of increased vulnerability is that the negative effect of disease status was larger in the younger strata of our sample than in the oldest groups (see Figure 2) . Cognitive performance of the group of individuals without any of the four cognition-related diagnoses and the group of individuals with one or more cognition-related diagnoses, in fact, converged at around age 95 (such convergence has been found previously in the relation between cognition and hypertension; Schultz, Dineen, Elias, Pentz, & Wood, 1979; Waldstein, 1995) .
Two longitudinal findings augment this surprising crosssectional result. First, the bottom right panel of Figure 3 shows that there was no significant trend toward divergence over time for the group of individuals not diagnosed with any of the cognitionrelated disorders at any of the two measurement points and the group of participants diagnosed with one or more of the cognitionrelated disorders at both measurement points. Performance in the diagnosis-absent group declined 2.7 points over the course of 4 years; decline in the diagnosis-present group equaled 2.0 points. Clearly, participants diagnosed with one or more of the cognitionrelated disorders did not decline reliably faster than participants without these disorders.
Second, Figure 3 also demonstrates that the decline experienced by the group of participants receiving their first cognition-related diagnosis between the first and second measurement points was not larger than the decline in the diagnosis-free group (the incidence group declined 2.6 points.) This finding implies that the impact of a particular cognition-related diagnosis received prior to entering the study was quite large (i.e., the diagnosis-present group performed lower than the diagnosis-absent group), but the impact of receiving a new diagnosis in between the first and second measurement points was quite limited and, in fact, so limited it could not be traced in our data (i.e., the incidence group did not decline more than the diagnosis-absent group). This finding suggests that the impact of disorders on cognitive performance is larger earlier in life (i.e., in the period before T1) than later in life (i.e., in the period between T1 and T3). Stroke, however, is a possible exception to this pattern, with a marginally significant interaction indicating that incident stroke cases decline faster.
How can this negative relation between age and the impact of disease on cognitive performance be explained? At least two mechanisms seem feasible. First, the convergence may be due to survival effects and selective attrition (see Waldstein, 1995 Waldstein, , 2000 , for a similar argument). That is, with advancing age, vulnerability for disease increases, resulting in higher mortality and, in survivors, in disabilities that might lead a prospective participant to decide not to get involved in a study as exacting as BASE. The net result is that the group of younger-older adults in the study is less selected and may even be quite representative of the population; the group of very old participants, however, is likely to be highly positively selected and represent only the highest levels of functioning present in the population (Lindenberger, Singer, & Baltes, 2002; . This introduces a bias in the data: The oldest participants in the study may well be functioning at such high level in comparison to their age peers that the presence of somatic disorder may not matter much, whereas the presence of such a disorder may well throw the cognitive system of younger, less selected older adults off-balance. Also, note that all prevalent cases are survivors, and very old adults who survive a potentially life-threatening condition may be of exceptional constitution.
A second explanation has opposite valence. It can be argued that with advancing age, biological changes increasingly resemble disease states. There is marked age-related decline, for instance, in brain volume, notably in the prefrontal cortex and hippocampal areas, which subserve higher order cognition (for a meta-analytic review, see Raz, 2000) . Blood flow in the CNS (the likely locus for the cognitive effects of cardiovascular disorders) is decreased by the effects of atherosclerosis, accumulated over a lifetime, as well as from age-related changes in elastin and collagen and from age-related calcium deposits (Beers & Berkow, 2000) . Negative age changes occur in the cholinergic system, the probable site of impact for diabetes (for a review, see Muir, 1997) . It is then possible that in very late life, subclinical changes in the substrate of the cognitive system are already overlapping to a large degree with the effects typically shown in CVDs, stroke, and diabetes. Therefore, the impact of these diseases on cognitive functioning in very old age may be smaller than their impact in younger adults, not because of decreased vulnerability but because the disease process adds little to the cumulative changes in brain physiology that have occurred over the course of a very long life. This process-overlap interpretation, then, assumes that the observed phenomena are real and that the observed decrease in vulnerability in very old age is caused, paradoxically, by an underlying decreasing intactness of the substrate.
Although it is impossible to distinguish empirically between the two interpretations on the basis of our results, previously published analyses using BASE data are compatible with this view of relatively global negative changes in the mind-body continuum. These include the observation of increased dedifferentiation of cognitive abilities, that is, very high intercorrelations among abilities that are typically less highly correlated in early adulthood , increased interrelatedness of the cognitive system and the sensorimotor system (P. B. , and decreased cognitive plasticity in this very old sample (Singer et al., 2000) .
Somatic Correlates of Cognition: Cardiovascular Risk Factors
After the four cognition-related diagnoses and dementia were taken into account, only alcohol consumption was found to be related to cognition. This finding implies that the possible effects of smoking, cholesterol, and obesity on cognition are mediated through their effects on CVD. There were no reliable differences in decline associated with cardiovascular risk factors. These results echo reports from the literature on the diminishing effects of cardiovascular risk factors on mortality in the very old (e.g., Corti et al., 1997; Krumholz, Seeman, Merrill, Mendes de Leon, & Vaccarino, 1994; Stevens et al., 1998; Woo, Ho, Yuen, Yu, & Lau, 1998) . Note, however, that the assessment of risk factors was limited: The lack of fasting preceding the cholesterol measures and the noninclusion of other risk factors shown in previous research to be correlated with cognition (e.g., glucose, insulin, homocysteine) are clear limitations of the present study.
Conclusions
We found that four cardiovascular and metabolic diagnoses were negatively associated with cognition after age, SES, sex, and dementia status were controlled for: congestive heart failure, stroke, coronary heart disease, and diabetes mellitus, with a joint effect of 0.47 standard deviations. The impact of disease status was largest on perceptual speed and fluency, memory was impacted only by diabetes, and knowledge was not related to any somatic diagnosis. There was no differential decline in participants diagnosed with one of these four diseases and those who were not. The only cardiovascular risk factor associated with cognitive performance was alcohol consumption.
